Michal Ovádek
Limiting the scope of EU law vis-à-vis national legislative measures is one thing but creating un-Chartered territory in EU law is another. It is understandable why the Court would want to stay away from the currently toxic migration politics. But it is worrying that it is willing to further limit the scope of the Charter when it might be needed the most.
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Daniel Sarmiento
The overall message looks puzzling. First, privacy is a super-fundamental right that reigns supreme above all other rights after the Court’s decision in Schrems. Second, national electoral rules governing the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament come under the scope of application of the Charter, but Member States can restrict such a right as long they do so in a proportionate way, says the Court in Delvigne. And third, illegal immigrants who have already been ordered to abandon the territory of the EU can be subject to criminal prosecution if they ever return, according to the Court in Celaj. In sum, Privacy is a super-fundamental right. The right to vote is quite super, but not as much. The rights to liberty and free movement are not super at all, at least when they concern third country nationals. Is this the kind of case-law one would expect from a fundamental rights court? Does this make any sense at all? Maybe it does.
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