Sébastien Platon
In it's recent "Delvigne" decision, the Court took a rather bold stance on the material scope of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament. I will however also argue that, in some respect, this stance was not bold enough.
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Daniel Sarmiento
The overall message looks puzzling. First, privacy is a super-fundamental right that reigns supreme above all other rights after the Court’s decision in Schrems. Second, national electoral rules governing the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament come under the scope of application of the Charter, but Member States can restrict such a right as long they do so in a proportionate way, says the Court in Delvigne. And third, illegal immigrants who have already been ordered to abandon the territory of the EU can be subject to criminal prosecution if they ever return, according to the Court in Celaj. In sum, Privacy is a super-fundamental right. The right to vote is quite super, but not as much. The rights to liberty and free movement are not super at all, at least when they concern third country nationals. Is this the kind of case-law one would expect from a fundamental rights court? Does this make any sense at all? Maybe it does.
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