26 June 2024
In Favour of the Hungarian Council Presidency
On the 1 July 2024, Hungary will start its second EU Council Presidency. In light of Hungary’s continuous breaches of the rule of law, questions have been posed whether the Presidency could be postponed or cancelled (also here). However, given the mere informal powers of the Presidency, I argue that the real damage is rather limited, especially because the Hungarian Presidency takes place just after the European elections. Finally, the Hungarian Presidency may even improve the connection of its citizens with the EU and show the best version of itself to the other Member States. Continue reading >>
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17 June 2024
Why an EU Country under the Surveillance Procedure (Article 7.1 TEU) Should not Chair the Council Presidency
In accordance with the Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, from July 1 of this year the office is to be held by Hungary. This occasion will mark the first time that the Presidency will have been held by a Member State that has been subject to the “surveillance” procedure in Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, having been launched by the European Parliament in September 2018. It would now be both prudent and sensible for the Council to delay the Hungarian Presidency to such a time when the Article 7(1) TEU surveillance procedure will have been successfully concluded. Such a postponement should not be considered as a sanction against Hungary, but rather a simple precautionary measure to preserve the smooth functioning of the European Union. Continue reading >>
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13 June 2024
Between Continuity and a Perforated ‘Cordon Sanitaire’
Fears of a radical right-wing wave dominated the debates leading up to the European Parliament (EP) elections. As the final votes are tallied across the 27 EU Member States, it has become evident that the predictions of pre-election polls have partially come true: Far-right parties secured about a quarter of the popular vote. What are the implications? While the current results likely indicate by-and-large continuity in the European Parliament, including an ongoing shift to the right on contested issues such as migration or climate policy, they had heavily disruptive consequences on the national level, which in France has resulted in snap parliamentary elections. This will have pronounced impact on the balance of power in the (European) Council and on the EU as a whole. Continue reading >>
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25 June 2023
Human Rights Violations to Deflect Refugees
The Council of the European Union (EU) recently reached a negotiating position (‘mandate’) on two significant elements of the ‘reform’ of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The vision hailed as a ‘historic’ agreement by national governments is a direct threat to the right to asylum. The Council not only maintains all structural flaws of the CEAS intact but proposes a quagmire of asylum procedures marred by unworkable, unnecessarily complex rules, that are in clear violation of key human rights standards. Continue reading >>16 May 2023
The National Case for Reforming the EU Treaties
Four arguments of either explicit or implicit importance in encouraging states to engage in Treaty reform in this ‘reform period’ are of decisive importance again now. Many of these arguments have already found their way into political discourse (for example into the cautious opening of the German government to Treaty reform) while others have not. The key to making the national case for Treaty reform may therefore lie in demonstrating to the Member States that these factors make opening-up the Treaties in their national interest. Continue reading >>
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07 July 2022
Untying the Ties that (don’t) Bind
In his letter to MEP Daniel Freund of 17 June 2022, European Council President Charles Michel argued that neither he, as President, nor the European Council have the power to exclude democratically unaccountable representatives of a Member State from that institution. But President Michel’s apparent recourse to a literal reading of Article 15(2) TEU – which fails to consider its relationship with other provisions relating to the composition of the European Council – is not convincing. Continue reading >>26 December 2020
Paradoxes and Dilemmas in Compliance and Enforcement
Scholars have relentlessly argued for tougher EU action against illiberal governments whose actions erode constitutional checks and balances. The panoply of EU tools is large and it comprises mechanisms for compliance via dialogue and engagement, the several infringement procedures and other ECJ cases with RoL implications, and procedures seeking enforcement. Yet, EU action remains inefficient since, to date, none of these mechanisms, jointly or individually, have been able to extract substantial compliance but rather what Agnes Batory called “symbolic and creative compliance” designed to create the appearance of norm‐conform behavior without giving up their original objectives. This poor performance reveals a crucial paradox on rule of law compliance: the EU is a community of law that lacks the last enforcement mechanism; i.e coercion. Continue reading >>
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13 December 2020
Compromising the Rule of Law while Compromising on the Rule of Law
Some EU leaders may assert that EU money will now be brought under the rule of law given that the Conditionality Regulation is now guaranteed to pass. But they are wrong. Continue reading >>28 May 2018
“A Bad Workman always Blames his Tools”: an Interview with LAURENT PECH
Constitutional capture in Poland and Hungary and what to expect from the European Commission, the Council and the Court of Justice: an interview with Laurent Pech. Continue reading >>25 February 2018