The Patriots for Europe

Never in the history of the EU has a political party at Union level so ostentatiously misnamed itself as the Patriots for Europe. Their name suggests a passionate love for homeland Europe but their Manifesto reveals an unmistakable commitment to dismantle European democracy and to reduce the EU to an undemocratic organisation of illiberal states. Following the recent European Parliament elections, the Patriots for Europe has emerged as nothing less than the third largest political party. I explore the core elements of their illiberal political agenda as outlined in their Manifesto and discuss how their proposed sovereign policies, if implemented, could reverse the progressive trajectory of European (legal) integration.

Launching a new party

The genesis of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) amply demonstrates that its founding parties did not envisage to strengthen European democracy by expressing the will of the citizens of the Union as Article 10 (4) stipulates. Paradoxically, the party was not even formed before the 2024 elections for the European Parliament but rather after the citizens had cast their votes. While the EP-elections took place in the period between 6 and 9 June 2024, the founders of the PfE launched their party only on the 30 June. After the Rassemblement National from France and the Dutch PVV had joined the new parliamentary group, it became clear that the national far-right parties only combined forces at the European level to undermine European democracy from within. It should therefore be recalled at this juncture that this manner of forming political parties at Union level would not have been possible if the outdated electoral system of the EU, enacted in 1976 under the regime of the Communities, had not been carried over to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (Article 223 TFEU).

Patriots for Europe

According to the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, the formation of a political group requires a minimum of 23 members originating from at least 7 Member States. Individual EP-members may participate in its functioning as NI’s (non-inscribed). The creation of a political group in the EP brings many advantages, including procedural privileges and financial subsidies. The formation of a political group also requires a formal statement concerning its principles and goals, which has to be submitted to the EP-President and has to be underwritten by each group member. As the constituent parties succeeded in time to comply with the requirements for forming a political group, the PfE entered the European Parliament with 84 members as its third largest group.

The Manifesto

In all its brevity, the PfE Manifesto is crystal clear about the political ambitions of the “Patriots”. The two pages-document is based on the assumption that European integration, although commendable at the start, has turned against the countries and peoples of Europe. It argues that, today, institutions largely unknown to and removed from European citizens are planning to replace the Nations of Europe with a European central state. Subsequently, it identifies “the Centralists who herald a new European superstate” as the culprits and portrays the Patriots and Sovereigntists as the liberators of our time, determined to retake our institutions and to reorient “European policy to serve our Nations and our people” (singular). Thus, the political fault line in the European Parliament is no longer between conservatives and liberals but between federalists and sovereigntists. The Manifesto elaborates this central claim by formulating the following three political priorities: sovereignty or taking back control, diplomacy instead of democracy, and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

Taking back control

Sovereignty: The Manifesto’s doctrine is based upon the principle of the unrestricted sovereignty of the Nations of Europe. In line with the Westphalian system of international relations, states are perceived as the highest entities on the continent. They must be free in their determination to live and cooperate with each other. As the EU has come to dominate, if not subjugate, the free nations of Europe, they must reclaim sovereignty. In the literature, this approach is underpinned by political theorists arguing that the concept of democracy presupposes a people (demos) and a national state. As a leading republican intergovernmentalist, Bellamy argues that European democracy erodes the national democracies of EU Member States and that the nation-states must reclaim control for the sake of democracy. He criticizes Brexit for the way it has been implemented but endorses the decision in principle.

Diplomacy: As it is impossible for democracy to thrive beyond the borders of national states, the relations between these states should form the exclusive domain of diplomats. Consequently, EU Member States must retain their right of veto. Accordingly, the system of EU-democracy must be replaced with diplomacy. In a similar way as the advocates of the “Leave campaign” in the UK argued that the EU had become the reincarnation of the worst dictatorships in European history, the Manifesto identifies “Brussels” as the enemy. The only difference between the Brexiteers and the Patriots is that the former wanted to use the UK’s legal right to withdraw from the EU in line with article 50 TEU, whereas the latter intend to deconstruct the Union from within.

The principle of non-interference in internal affairs: The third focal point of the Patriot’s Manifesto reveals the hidden intention of its initiator Viktor Orbán. Together with his Polish counterpart, the Hungarian Prime Minister had used the same argument in their appeal to the CJEU concerning the introduction of the conditionality mechanism in the Recovery and Resilience Fund, created to overcome the negative effects of COVID-19 pandemic. They invoked the Westphalian principle of non-interference by a higher authority in the internal affairs of a sovereign state as a philosophical disguise for their intention to abolish the EU’s control over the expenditure of these funds. After the CJEU had rejected his claim, Orbán used the Manifesto of the Patriots for Europe to reintroduce this argument in the political arena.

In summary, the Manifesto presents an alternative to the European “super state”, which the EU allegedly has become. Its core ambition is to restore national sovereignty. A key element in the strategy for achieving this goal is the substitution of diplomacy for democracy. As the European Parliament is the main institution meddling into internal affairs of European states, notably with respect to illegal immigration and gender issues, replacing democracy with diplomacy forms the most effective strategy for guaranteeing the revival of the nations of Europe. Reflecting recent legal developments, notably the Conditionality Verdicts of the CJEU, the Manifesto adds that the EU should cease to justify its attacks on national sovereignty by applying pressure through the European budget.

A democratic union of democratic states

Seen in this perspective, the PfE appears to have a compelling case. The question that must be raised, however, is whether the enemy is real or imaginary? As the Patriots’ Manifesto demonstrates a solid trust in international treaties, it may be fruitful to investigate whether the Lisbon Treaty is indeed constructing the Union as a super state. Subsequently, if the EU is not (yet) a European central state, could the Treaties pave the way for the Union to establish itself as one sooner or later?

The answer is clearly no. Suggestions that institutions have hijacked the EU and are now turning it into a super state, are simply false. They overlook the fact that the Member States have given an entirely different dimension to their sustained integration efforts. The founding parties introduced the practice of sharing sovereignty and initiated the process of European integration as democratic states. They did not sacrifice democracy for the sake of integration but rather wanted their organisation to be democratic too. So, the Member States first agreed on their common democratic values and subsequently applied these values to their Union. The democratic principle driving the EU’s evolution is the following. If two or more democratic states share the exercise of sovereignty in ever wider fields with the view to attain common goals, their organisation must meet similar democratic standards as its Member States. The result of their sustained endeavour is that the Member States have created a new model of democracy. They have transformed a mere union of democratic states into “a union of democratic states which also constitutes a democracy of its own”.

Henceforth, the EU does not form a state let alone a “super state”. It is not a mere association of states either. Hence, the Union needs a new term to be identified with. In line with its genesis and competences, the EU can be described from the internal perspective of its citizens as a democratic union of democratic states, while it may be identified from the perspective of global governance as a democratic international organisation.

Undemocratic and illiberal

The Manifesto’s portrayal of the EU as a super state serves only as a pretext for the Patriots to attack European democracy. The ground for the present assault has been prepared by a global wave of democratic backsliding and constitutional erosion. Having been ruled by Orbán and his Fidesz party for over a decade, Hungary is no longer regarded as a democracy by the USA. According to its statutes, the Dutch constituent member party PVV consists of one man only. Wilders simply does not tolerate democratic decision making in his own party. As the member parties of the PfE do not respect democracy and the rule of law at home, they want to free themselves of these values in the context of the EU too. In political terms, one might argue that the goal of the PfE is to reverse the European Union from a democratic union of democratic states towards an undemocratic organisation of illiberal states.

Countering the attack

Besieged by the enemy from within, the other democratic parties in the European Parliament used the constitutive session of July 2024 for bridging their differences and forming a pro-European coalition. The Christian-Democrats, the Social-Democrats, the Liberals and the Greens agreed to lend their support to Commission President Von der Leyen on the one hand and to prevent the Patriots for Europe from occupying crucial parliamentary positions on the other hand. They need to protect the European democracy, especially after the Patriots’ alignment with Russia in its war against Ukraine. At the start of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU, PM Orbán even abused his temporary position for taking counterproductive diplomatic initiatives without authorisation by the other Member States or by the competent EU-institutions. While early critics pointed out that the Presidency of the Council of a democratic union of democratic states should not be entrusted to an illiberal autocrat in the first place, Orbán may have effectively strengthened the pro-European coalition against the PfE. However, it remains to be seen whether the spontaneously formed coalition will hold and whether it can be effective in the light of continuous efforts to paralyse the functioning of the European Parliament and that of the EU at large. Given the European Parliament’s ambitious objectives, there is no reason to believe that the Patriots will acquiesce to being sidelined after the constitutive week. The European Parliament should therefore brace itself for a prolonged period of intense political disagreements. Since the goals and ambitions of their Manifesto cannot be realized without treaty changes, and given their likely inability to secure majorities for their political initiatives, it is quite possible that they will resort to tactics of parliamentary obstruction.