The Second Round that Wasn’t

On 6 December 2024, the final day of Romania’s most turbulent presidential election campaign in the last 25 years, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling that was unprecedented not only in recent Romanian, but also in European constitutional history: it annulled the first round of the elections, held on 24 November, and ordered the entire electoral process to restart. Only 4 days earlier, on 2 December 2024, the same Court had ruled not to annul the first round of the elections. What led to this dramatic shift between those two dates?

The decision is extreme and deeply concerning in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, and it is hard to comprehend under normal circumstances. To understand and evaluate this decision, one must consider the broader context of the presidential elections and the previous interventions of the Constitutional Court regarding the electoral procedure. Seen in this light, the circumstances under which this decision was made appear anything but normal.

The Context

In Romania, the President is elected directly by the people in two rounds. The second round takes place if no candidate secures a majority of valid votes in the first round, with the top two candidates proceeding to the second. Two government institutions are responsible for organizing the presidential elections – the temporary Central Electoral Bureau (BEC), and the permanent Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), each with distinct powers in the electoral process. The BEC plays a central role, including registering candidates, whereas the AEP is mainly tasked with administrative duties (organizing polling stations, printing ballots, etc.).

The first significant controversy in this electoral cycle was the candidacy of Diana Sosoaca, a nationalist extremist, which was annulled by the Constitutional Court in October. The Court based its ruling on the candidate’s behaviour and statements, which it deemed anti-constitutional, against Romania’s membership in NATO and the European Union and contrary to the liberal democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution. This ruling was controversial, with parts of the legal community, civil society and political circles arguing that the Court overstepped its bounds. The Court’s organic law only permits the removal of a candidate from the race on legal grounds, such as failure to meet the formal requirements. A dissenting opinion from a constitutional judge noted that “no constitutional or legal provision allows the Constitutional Court, by interpreting its own power (at its turn, expressly limited by the Constitution and the law) to extend and supplement (…) with two new conditions for the candidates, of an obviously subjective nature (as they regard aspects of a person’s behaviour, opinions and statements)”. Nevertheless, it was this “innovative” interpretation that ultimately enabled the Court to annul the election results on 6 December.

After this bumpy start, the electoral campaign proceeded in a seemingly ordinary way. The first round of elections took place on 24 November. Exit polls at the close of the voting revealed a fairly predictable result: social-democrat candidate Marcel Ciolacu in first place, followed by center-right candidate Elena Lasconi, far-right candidate George Simion, and others. However, by the morning of the 25 November, the order dramatically changed, with the virtually unknown “independent” candidate Calin Georgescu claiming first place, followed by Elena Lasconi. The shock came from the fact that Georgescu had been given negligible scores in polls throughout the campaign, had not participated in any televised debates and had been largely “invisible” in the mainstream media. Nevertheless, he had been heavily promoted on TikTok, receiving millions of views in the final days of the campaign. His statements on TikTok and on other rather obscure platforms, which were pro-Putin, anti-NATO and anti-EU, along with his praise for extremist movements from World War II (such as “Garda de Fier” and the fascist dictator Antonescu), raised suspicions of foreign interference in his candidacy and the unexpectedly high number of votes he received.

Against this backdrop of a suspected hybrid attack on democracy in Romania by a foreign power, the Constitutional Court was asked to rule on a request to annul the first round, alleging vote fraud in favour of candidate Elena Lasconi. On 29 November, two days before the parliamentary elections on 1 December, the Court postponed its decision for Monday, 2 December, and ordered a recount of all votes cast in the first round. Following a partial recount, the Court ruled on 2 December to validate the first round of the election.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Council for Defense of the Country (CSAT) met on 29 November to discuss possible foreign interference in the election process and its potential threat to national security. The findings were not made public.

After the Court’s ruling of 2 December, the AEP began preparing for the second round, scheduled for 8 December. On 4 December, the President of Romania declassified the intelligence presented to the CSAT the week before, which revealed illegal interferences with the election process in favour of the candidate Călin Georgescu, including manipulation of the TikTok platform, suspicious financial transactions and the “interference of a [foreign] state actor”. The General Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation into these illegal electoral interferences. The following day, numerous complaints were submitted to the Constitutional Court, requesting the annulment of the first round. In the evening of 5 December, the Court announced that, since the deadline for the first round had passed, the complaints would not be examined until after the second round, scheduled for 8 December.

All these constitutional developments occured against a backdrop of economic concern and street protests in support of liberal democracy and Romania’s European trajectory. Pro-European and pro-NATO parties and organisations expressed their support for candidate Elena Lasconi.

In an unprecedented move, the Court convened on 6 December and decided to annul the entire electoral process.

The Rulings of 2 December and of 6 December

It is important to note from the outset that the existing legislation contains significant gaps, either lacking express provisions on certain procedures or being imprecise. Therefore, the Court’s interpretative work was particularly necessary in this case.

Ruling no 31, issued on 2 December, validated the first round based on the recount of votes and Article 52 of the Law on the election of the President, which stipulates that the Constitutional Court may annul an election if fraud has affected the attribution of mandates or the ranking of the candidates for the second round. After the recount, the Court found no evidence of fraud (though the law does not define the concept of ‘fraud’). However, despite the CSAT’s earlier meeting and the availability of some public information on the findings, the Court did not request classified information from the CSAT that might have been relevant to its ruling, relying only on the recount.

Ruling no. 32, issued on 6 December, was a direct consequence of the declassification of information by the President. The Court did not address any of the complaints filed after declassification but declared its authority to act under its general power to “ensure compliance with the procedure for electing the President of Romania and confirm the results of the vote” (Article 146 f of the Constitution), as a “guarantor of the supremacy of the Constitution” (Article 142 (1) of the Constitution). After considering the declassified information, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to annul the entire election process, which it found to have been tainted by the actions of one of the candidates who advanced to the second round. These actions involved “multiple irregularities and violations of the electoral legislation“ which compromised the fairness of the vote and distorted the transparency and equity of the electoral campaign. The Court found that these violations, including illegal social media campaigning, had a cumulative effect that undermined the essential principles of democratic elections. Consequently, the Court annulled the election and ordered the Government to set a new election date.

What Are The Consequences of the Ruling?

The ruling has constitutional, political, and potentially economic and geo-political consequences.

From a constitutional perspective, the electoral process will restart, and new elections will be called. Candidacies are likely to be subject to stricter scrutiny than before, considering the recent  developments, including the annulment of Diana Sosoaca’s candidacy on 5 October. It is expected that other candidacies may be rejected by the BEC or annulled by the Constitutional Court on grounds beyond mere legal compliance at the moment of registration.

Secondly, the Constitutional Court held that the current President’s term will be extended beyond the usual five-years period (which ends on 21 December) until the newly elected President takes the oath of office. This extension is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, which states that the presidential term may only be extended by law, “in case of war or catastrophe”. The ruling, however, is based on another provision of the Constitution, specifically Article 83(2), which states that the office of the President lasts until the newly elected President takes the oath. This provision applies to “normal” circumstances, referring to elections that take place before the end of the President’s term, not after. The Court’s interpretation is preferable to the extended application of the rule regarding the interim office, which states that “in case of vacancy in the office of President, or if the President is suspended from office or is temporarily incapable to exercise his powers, the interim shall devolve, in this order, on the President of the Senate or the President of the Chamber of Deputies” (Article 98 (1) of the Constitution). However, in this case, there is another gap: the failure of a presidential elections is not listed as a situation that would lead to a “vacancy in the office”.

Politically, reactions have been mixed, ranging from criticism of the ruling as “illegal and illegitimate” (Elena Lasconi) to praising it as “the only correct solution after the declassification” (Marcel Ciolacu). President Iohannis linked the interference to  foreign state involvement, while the French Embassy commented on “Russian interferences that aimed at the alteration of the integrity of the elections”, and the US State Department expressed confidence in Romania’s democratic institutions. Civil society reactions are likely to follow in the coming days.

From an economic and geo-political standpoint, the constitutional crisis in Romania increases regional instability. This is particularly concerning given that the far-right now holds 30% of seats in the Romanian Parliament following the 1 December parliamentary elections, and the pro-European majority is fragile. The outcome of the presidential elections is significant not for the powers of the office, which are rather limited Romania’s semi-presidential system, but for its symbolic value: a pro-European president in a country with a war raging on its borders could be a vital guarantor of both democratic order and regional stability of the region.

Lessons to be learned?

This unprecedented case underscores that no liberal democracy is immune to hybrid attacks on its core electoral processes – particularly in an era dominated by social media and increasingly powerful artificial intelligence. The first lesson is the need for more effective safeguards, especially of a constitutional and legal-procedural nature, to prevent such attacks, alongside existing institutional protections (intelligence and defense services). The second lesson, specific to Romania, is that excessive fragmentation of the political scene can leave liberal democratic forces more vulnerable to the rise of far-right, sovereignist and populist movements.

In Romania, it is evident that legislative gaps (such as the lack of effective procedures to prevent foreign interference via social media), poor communication between state agencies and delayed institutional responses contributed to the situation escalating to a point where the elections were annulled at the last moment, after the voting had already commenced. Urgent legislative changes are needed to tighten regulations of electoral campaigns, social media, and particularly platforms like TikTok that played a significant role in this major crisis. Legal safeguards must be clear, proportional, and designed to protect against abuse while meeting the standards of democratic societies.

Other countries may look to Romania’s example as a warning to fortify their own electoral processes against similar attacks.